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ABSTRACT
This article offers a feminist critique of the Surrogacy (Regulation) Bill, 
2019. Fifteen years since the first proposed regulation of assisted repro-
ductive technologies and surrogacy, the 2019 Bill leaves much to be 
desired. It reflects a limited understanding of the complexities of surro-
gacy, is discriminatory in its approach, is plagued by lack of clarity, is 
unrealistic and most importantly, does not include adequate safeguards 
for the surrogate. Women’s reproductive labour in performing surro-
gacy is valorized but not compensated. Even though the Bill may well 
accept some recommendations of the Rajya Sabha select Committee, its 
failure to address issues that we highlight will mean that if passed, it will 
be challenged in the courts on constitutional grounds. This will generate 
uncertainty for years, for many infertile couples and individuals who 
look to the law for streamlined regulation, defeating its main purpose in 
facilitating a novel mode of reproduction.
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Surrogacy is a novel and arguably desirable opportunity for family formation for many 
individuals and couples, while simultaneously being a maelstrom for a range of ethical issues 
implicating numerous legal fields. In the past decade or so, these complexities have become 
exacerbated through reproductive tourism enabled by globalization. Governments have 
globally engaged in a form of “regulatory arbitrage”, whereby the prohibition of surrogacy 
(commercial or altruistic) in certain countries leads to more permissive legal regimes else-
where. For feminists in particular, surrogacy presents a formidable challenge. On the one 
hand, it queers compulsory heteronormativity and the heteropatriarchal family-form while 
on the other, generating exploitative arrangements for surrogates in the global South as 
reproductive markets present favourable economic terms and bargaining power for intending 
parents from the global North. Correspondingly, the law has become a site for intense 
political, social and economic contestation over the status of women’s reproductive 
labour.1 In this article, we offer one feminist perspective on the regulation of surrogacy by 
CONTACT Prabha Kotiswaran prabha.kotiswaran@kcl.ac.uk Dickson Poon School of Law, King’s College London, 
UK
1This is the labour involved in performing social reproduction which is defined by Hoskyns and Rai to be “biological reproduction; 
unpaid production in the home (both goods and services); social provisioning (. . . voluntary work directed at meeting needs in 
the community); the reproduction of culture and ideology; and the provision of sexual, emotional and affective services (such as 
are required to maintain family and intimate relationships)” C Hoskyns and S Rai, ‘Recasting the global political economy: 
Counting women’s unpaid work’ [2007] 12(3) New Political Economy 297–317, 300.
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focusing on a critique of the Surrogacy (Regulation) Bill 2019 (hereinafter the Bill) which was 
passed by the Lok Sabha in August 2019 and which is due to be presented before the Rajya 
Sabha in the next session of Parliament. We start by offering our assessment of the feminist 
normative landscape on surrogacy and then chronicle India’s efforts to regulate surrogacy. 
We then undertake a detailed analysis of the Bill along four axes, namely, locating surrogacy 
in the larger milieu of assisted reproductive technologies (ARTs) and examining eligibility 
criteria for commissioning surrogacy, the issue of “compensation” for surrogates and finally, 
the criminalization of surrogacy in the Bill, while paying particular attention to whether the 
Bill in its current form will pass constitutional muster. We conclude by reflecting on what 
India can learn from international trends on surrogacy law and policy. Needless to say, the 
social realities of surrogacy invite consideration of numerous other legal issues which are 
beyond the scope of this article. However, we hope that our snapshot view of the Bill as it 
stands today will help inform debates as the Bill enters the final stages of deliberations by 
Parliament, making possible the culmination of a regulatory journey that began nearly fifteen 
years ago.
Feminist theorizing on surrogacy
Surrogacy has long been a fraught domain for feminists. Alison Bailey notes that Western 
feminists theorized surrogacy in two phases: an intensely normative phase in the 1980s 
when they offered liberal, Marxist and radical feminist analyses of commercial surrogacy 
and since the mid-1990s, through a discernible biomedical ethnographic turn to under-
stand how surrogacy work is lived, embodied and negotiated, thereby heralding a move 
from moral certainty to moral ambivalence.2 Indian feminists similarly offer both 
normative and ethnographic theorizing on surrogacy, even if there is no temporal 
distinction between these enterprises. Liberal feminists support commercial surrogacy 
with adequate safeguards3 while radical feminists view reproductive tourism as being at 
the crossroads of reproductive, sexual and labour trafficking4 with commercial surrogacy 
being an exploitative trade in reproductive body parts.5 Marxist feminists similarly view 
commercial surrogacy as a form of reproductive trafficking.6 Kumkum Sangari maps how 
commercial surrogacy amounts to the appropriation of women’s reproductive labour by 
‘biocapital’7 and is organized in the form of a post-Fordist manufacturing model char-
acterized by flexibility where the burden of uncertainty and repeat failure is on the 
women8 whose voices are lost through the triple discourse of “remediable poverty, 
calibrated entrepreneurialism and familial altruism”.9
2A Bailey, ‘Reconceiving Surrogacy: Toward a Reproductive Justice Account of Indian Surrogacy’ [2011] 26(4) Hypatia 
715–741.
3G Aravamudan, Baby makers: The story of Indian surrogacy (Harper Collins 2014).
4S Dasgupta and S Das Dasgupta, ‘Business as Usual?: The Violence of Reproductive Trafficking in the Indian Context’ in 
S Dasgupta and S Das Dasgupta (eds), Globalization and Transnational Surrogacy in India: Outsourcing Life (Lexington 
Books 2014) 194.
5J Agnihotri Gupta, ‘Reproductive Biocrossings: Indian Egg Donors and Surrogates in the Globalized Fertility Market’ 
[2012] 5(1) International Journal of Feminist Approaches to Bioethics 25–51.
6M Rao, ‘Why All Non-Altruistic Surrogacy Should Be Banned’ [2012] 47(21) Economic & Political Weekly 15–17.
7K Sangari, Solid:Liquid: A (Trans)National Reproductive Formation (Tulika Books 2015) 87.
8ibid 78.
9ibid 113.
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Most Indian feminists adopt a materialist feminist position wherein surrogates are 
understood as subject to the twin forces of capitalism and patriarchy. Amongst these are 
several feminist ethnographers who view surrogates as performing highly gendered, 
exceptionally corporeal, and stigmatized10 reproductive labour11 against the backdrop 
of structural inequalities, an aggressively anti-natalist state, a larger project of neo- 
eugenics12 and “stratified reproduction” wherein a race-based reproductive hierarchy is 
sustained by the international division of labour and intentional state policies. These 
feminists are pragmatic towards regulation and oppose bans on commercial surrogacy, 
informed by a view that the market will be driven underground if surrogacy is banned, in 
turn harming surrogates.
Our own position mirrors this materialist feminist approach. In the context of 
gestational surrogacy (where the surrogate cannot use her oocytes) provisioned through 
a highly medicalized ART industry, the work of surrogates is technologically-aided, 
affective reproductive labour. We recognize that women undertake surrogacy under 
highly unequal conditions of capitalist patriarchy, but do not find it exceptional in 
relation to a range of other forms of gendered reproductive labour, including domestic 
work, erotic dancing, sex work or unpaid care and domestic work done by housewives, 
such that it warrants exceptional treatment by the state. We acknowledge power differ-
entials, constrained choices and exploitative relations shaped by a globalized context and 
believe that women’s agency in wanting to become surrogates for a fee cannot be 
dismissed as false consciousness. Finally, we are opposed to prohibitionism and blanket 
bans, which are oblivious to the lived realities of surrogates and instead focus on how law 
can ensure economic justice for them.
Regulatory landscape of surrogacy in India
India is probably one of the few countries in the world to have adopted every possible 
regulatory approach to surrogacy in the space of fifteen years. An early attempt was made 
by the Indian Council of Medical Research (ICMR) in 2005 through the National 
Guidelines for Accreditation, Supervision & Regulation of Assisted Reproductive 
Technology Clinics in India. Thereafter, separate chapters on surrogacy were included in 
the various versions of the Draft Assisted Reproductive Technologies (Regulation) Bill 
(hereinafter the ART Bill) proposed between 2008 and 2013. These laws were liberal in their 
regulatory approach towards ARTs and surrogacy. Between 2012 and 2016, however, the 
proposed laws became increasingly restrictive. The proposals went from being highly 
favourable to fertility clinics (and less so to surrogates) to severely restricting actors who 
could avail of ART on the basis of marital status, sexual orientation and nationality/ 
citizenship with correspondingly increasing levels of protection to surrogates. Between 
2012 and 2015, administrative orders issued by the Ministry of Home Affairs regulated the 
visa requirements for foreign intending couples who sought surrogacy services in India, 
10A Pande, Wombs in Labor: Transnational Commercial Surrogacy in India (Columbia University Press 2014) 6.
11Pande (n 10); S Rudrappa, Discounted Life: The Price of Global Surrogacy in India (NYU Press 2015); D Deomampo, 
Transnational Reproduction: Race, Kinship, and Commercial Surrogacy in India (NYU Press 2016); K Vora, Life Support: 
Biocapital and the New History of Outsourced Labor (University of Minnesota Press 2015); A Majumdar, Transnational 
Commercial Surrogacy and the (Un)Making of Kin in India (Oxford University Press 2017).
12Pande (n 10) 23.
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introducing a new visa category before moving towards a prohibition13 for such couples in 
2015 in response to a public interest litigation14 filed to prohibit commercial surrogacy.
In 2016, the government decided to address the regulation of ARTs and surrogacy 
through separate legislations and introduced the Surrogacy (Regulation) Bill, 2016 in the 
Lok Sabha on 21 November 2016. A draft Assisted Reproductive Technology 
(Regulation) Bill, 2020 was introduced in Parliament on 14 September 2020 (2020 ART 
Bill).15 The 2016 Bill which sought to prohibit commercial surrogacy and permit only 
altruistic surrogacy under limited conditions was meanwhile referred to a Department- 
related Parliamentary Standing Committee (PSC) on Health and Family Welfare which 
submitted the 102nd report in August 2017. Based on extensive consultations with 
numerous stakeholders (governmental and otherwise), the Committee recommended 
the reversal of almost every key feature of the 2016 Bill. It proposed a “compensated” 
model for surrogacy over an altruistic form and stated that surrogates did not have to be 
close relatives of the intending parents. It also liberalized the eligibility criteria for 
intending parents by extending the surrogacy option to live-in couples, divorced 
women, widows, non-resident Indians (“NRIs”), Persons of Indian Origin (“PIOs”) 
and Overseas Citizens of India (“OCIs”) and required only one year of proven infertility 
before availing of surrogacy. However, the 2016 Bill lapsed with the dissolution of the 
16th Lok Sabha in 2019. The 2019 version of the Bill was re-introduced in the Lok Sabha 
on 15 July 2019 and was passed on 5 August 2019 (Bill No. 156-C of 2019) without 
incorporating any recommendations of the PSC report. It was then introduced and 
debated in the Rajya Sabha on 19 and 20 November 2019.
During the debates in the Rajya Sabha on the Bill, numerous MPs spoke eloquently on 
many of the key issues that the Bill fails to address. To highlight a few examples: who can 
be an intending parent, particularly referring to marital status and citizenship,16 how 
infertility is defined,17 the stigma around infertility in a patriarchal context18and the 
possibilities of harnessing scientific advancement to address such concerns,19 the lack of 
focus on the rights of children born out of surrogacy,20 the question of compensation to 
the surrogate and disregard of the recommendations of the PSC Report in this Bill.21 As 
Rajya Sabha MPs repeatedly pointed out, consideration of this Bill was woefully incom-
plete in the absence of the ART Bill. In light of these reservations expressed by several 
13Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India, Orders No. 25022/74/2011-F.I dated 9 July 2012, 7 March 2013 and 
22 September 2015.
14Jayashree Wad v Union of India, W.P.(C) 95/2015
15The Assisted Reproductive Technologies (Regulation) Bill, 2020. Bill No. 97 of 2020, As introduced in Lok Sabha. See: 
<https://www.prsindia.org/billtrack/assisted-reproductive-technology-regulation-bill-2020> accessed on 
22 September 2020.
16Prof. MV Rajeev Gowda spoke against the exclusion of “Single parents, living partners, divorcees, same sex couples and 
couples, where one of the partners is not Indian” in accessing surrogacy (19 November 2019 Uncorrected Rajya Sabha 
Debates – 17.00 to 18.00, p.1).
17Kahkashan Parveen highlighted the need to reduce the time period to define infertility to one year as against five years 
(19 November 2019 Uncorrected Rajya Sabha Debates – 17.00 to 18.00, p.35). Vijaysai Reddy spoke about the need to 
take “into account other medical conditions such as women may conceive but may not be able to carry for the nine 
months during her pregnancy or may have multiple miscarriages. There are conditions such as hypertension, diabetes 
that affects the pregnancy. These other conditions have not been taken into consideration while making the definition 
for infertility.” (20 November 2019 Uncorrected Rajya Sabha Debates – 14.00 to 15.00, p.2).
18Abir Ranjan Biswas (19 November 2019 Uncorrected Rajya Sabha Debates – 17.00 to 18.00, p.15).
19Prof. MV Rajeev Gowda (19 November 2019 Uncorrected Rajya Sabha Debates – 16.00 to 17.00, p.32).
20Dr. Amee Yajnik argued that the needs and the rights of the child should actually be put at the centre in drafting a Bill 
on this subject (20 November 2019 Uncorrected Rajya Sabha Debates – 14.00 to 15.00, p.22).
21Prof. Ramgopal Yadav (19 November 2019 Uncorrected Rajya Sabha Debates – 17.00 to 18.00, p.25).
4 S. BANERJEE AND P. KOTISWARAN
MPs, the Bill was referred to a Select Committee of the Rajya Sabha (RSC) that examined 
it, undertook field visits around the country and submitted its report on 5 February 2020.
The RSC underscored the importance of passing the ART Bill before the Surrogacy Bill 
since the medical processes involved in the latter are best regulated through the ART Bill. 
This report reiterated several recommendations made by the PSC. It emphasized the 
need to broaden eligibility criteria for who can be a part of surrogacy – permitting PIOs 
and OCIs, widowed and divorced women to commission a surrogacy and any “willing 
woman” within the prescribed age limit and meeting other criteria to act as a surrogate 
without having to be a “close relative.” The RSC noted that surrogacy can be medically 
indicated rather than having the intending couple prove infertility over an extended 
period of unprotected coitus. This report however, upheld the Bill’s approach of allowing 
only altruistic surrogacy thus rejecting both commercial and compensatory surrogacy. It 
noted that, “both . . . commercial and compensatory surrogacy is (sic.) fraught with the 
risk of exploitation and commodifying the noble instinct of motherhood”22 and in 
a rhetorical move, asked “whether such a sublime and divine instinct of motherhood 
could be allowed to be turned into a mechanical paid service of procreation devoid of 
divine warmth and affection.”23 However, it did allow for an expansion of the insurance 
cover that the surrogate could receive to include medical costs (rather than only cover 
loss, damage, illness or death as listed in the Bill) and other “prescribed expenses” for 
a longer duration of 36 months in contrast to the 16 months’ duration envisaged by the 
Bill. The RSC unlike the PSC did not detail what would comprise “prescribed expenses.”
A feminist critique of the Surrogacy (Regulation) Bill, 2019
Against this backdrop, we offer a critique of the Bill in order to ensure non- 
discrimination, equality of access to surrogacy and economic justice for surrogates. 
A broader engagement with the normative questions around law and reproductive 
technologies is beyond the scope of this article. As the Indian state inches closer towards 
prohibiting commercial surrogacy, our critique highlights key areas that can, and must be 
rethought and reworked before being presented to Parliament for reconsideration, 
especially in view of the two parliamentary committees’ reports. In particular, we inter-
rogate the following aspects: the relationship between surrogacy and ARTs, eligibility 
criteria for intending parents and surrogates laid down in the Bill, the issue of “compen-
sation” for surrogacy, and the implementation and enforcement provisions of the Bill.
Surrogacy and ARTs
The Bill and the ART Bill are complementary legislations in various ways. Seeking to pass 
the Bill in the absence of the ART Bill produced confusion as illustrated below – in terms 
of definitions of key medical procedures and overlaps in their regulation, the absence of 
regulation of gamete donation, and protection of the rights of children born out of 
surrogacy. Despite introduction of the 2020 ART Bill, all these issues remain inade-
quately addressed.
22Select Committee, Rajya Sabha, Report on The Surrogacy (Regulation) Bill, 2019, para 4.8, p.22.
23Select Committee, Rajya Sabha, Report on The Surrogacy (Regulation) Bill, 2019, para 4.11, p.23.
INDIAN LAW REVIEW 5
The use of ARTs is central since only gestational surrogacy is permissible under 
section 4(iii)(b)(I). However, it is a glaring gap that the Bill does not include 
a definition of the very important term – “Assisted Reproductive Technology.” Section 
2(zc) which defines “Surrogacy”, does not mention use of ARTs whereas the definition of 
“surrogacy procedures” [section 2 (ze)] and “surrogate mother” [section 2 (zf)] include it, 
demonstrating inconsistency. Similarly, the definition of “commercial surrogacy” in 
section 2(f) refers to In Vitro Fertilization (IVF), an ART procedure. The definition of 
“commercial surrogacy” in section 2(f) for instance refers to IVF, an ART procedure, 
only by implication through the phrase “component procedures”, and not directly.24 In 
the absence of the ART Bill, it was unclear as to how the “component procedures” of 
surrogacy are to be regulated. It would be ideal for the definition of surrogacy to only 
mention “services of surrogate motherhood” to avoid conflating surrogacy with a vast 
array of ARTs. Finally, the registration requirements set out in Section 10 for surrogacy 
clinics need to be aligned with corresponding provisions of the ART Bill especially since 
all fertility clinics regulated by the ART Bill may not conduct surrogacy but all clinics that 
conduct surrogacy will be fertility clinics that offer IVF services. In light of such draw-
backs in regulating surrogacy in the absence of an ART Bill, the RSC rightly recom-
mended that the ART Bill be introduced prior to this Bill.
Meanwhile, the 2020 ART Bill, as introduced in the Lok Sabha makes it mandatory for 
all establishments offering ARTs to be registered and lays down informed consent 
procedures.25 It provides that the national and state boards under the 2020 ART Bill 
will be the same as the Surrogacy Boards created under the Bill. The two Bills however 
create multiple agencies for purposes of registering surrogacy clinics and ART clinics and 
banks. Thus, the processes needed for implementing the two legislations do not seem to 
be streamlined.26
With regard to the eligibility certificate to be obtained by the surrogate, Section 4(iii) 
(b)(I)27 specifies that no woman (other than an ever-married woman with a child and 
between the ages of 25 and 35 years) can be a surrogate mother or donate her egg or 
oocyte. This provision is poorly drafted. On the face of it, it appears as though a surrogate 
mother could potentially donate her eggs. However, from subclause (III)28 we can 
conclude that the surrogate mother cannot donate her gametes. Similarly, in Section 39 
(dealing with a presumption of coercion in case of surrogacy) there is reference to the 
woman who donates gametes for surrogacy. Since egg donation is highly likely in cases of 
surrogacy which are medically indicated, it is necessary to have protocols and regulations 
for the same. If the Bill visualizes the donation of gametes (specifically eggs) and 
24It reads “commercialisation of surrogacy services or procedures or its component services or component procedures 
including selling or buying of human embryo or trading in the sale or purchase of human embryo or gametes or selling 
or buying or trading the services of surrogate motherhood by way of giving payment, reward, benefit, fees, 
remuneration or monetary incentive in cash or kind.”
25PM India, ‘Cabinet approves the Assisted Reproductive Technology Regulation Bill 2020  (PM India, 19 February 2020) 
<https://www.pmindia.gov.in/en/news_updates/cabinet-approves-the-assisted-reproductive-technology-regulation- 
bill-2020/> accessed 1 August 2020.
26See Prabha Kotiswaran, ‘Assisted Reproductive Technology Bill needs a thorough review’ Indian Express 
(9 October 2020).
27It states, “no woman, other than an ever married woman having a child of her own and between the age of 25 to 
35 years on the day of implantation, shall be a surrogate mother or help in surrogacy by donating her egg or oocyte or 
otherwise.”
28It specifies, “no woman shall act as a surrogate mother by providing her own gametes.”
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eligibility criteria for such donors, then it must streamline the gamete donation process in 
this Bill and specify in detail provisions for protection of the egg donor as well, on par 
with the surrogate, which are currently missing. Otherwise, it appears that the egg donor 
cannot even expect that her medical expenses and the costs of insurance coverage will be 
met by the intending couple. Egg donation is more appropriately a subject matter for the 
ART Bill yet the 2020 ART Bill also does not provide adequate protection for the egg 
donor allowing only for insurance coverage for medical complications or death.
Similarly, section 35(1)(e) prohibits a person or organization from selling a human 
embryo or gamete for the purposes of surrogacy. The rest of the subclause deals with 
organized networks that actively buy and sell embryos and gametes in relation to which 
the prohibition is reasonable. However, it is unclear under what conditions the intending 
couple can secure either sperm or eggs in order to complete the surrogacy. The term 
“sell” needs clarification here. If gamete donation is envisaged, then the conditions under 
which this is permissible must be specified, which may well be regulated by the ART Bill. 
The 2020 ART Bill specifies no protocols in this regard. Further, the subclause needs 
qualification in a manner similar to the proviso to section 3(vii) which prohibits the 
storage of an embryo or gametes unless it is legally stored by sperm banks and IVF clinics 
or for purposes of conducting medical research. There needs to be a clarification regard-
ing the transactions that would involve retrieval from storage for use, what entails “use”, 
who can do so and under what conditions, including the question of “sale”, costs involved 
or compensation as may be relevant.
Section 4(iii)(b)(IV) says that a woman can be a surrogate only once, however, there is 
a need for standardization of the number of embryos that can be transferred in any given 
attempt of an IVF cycle with the ART Bill. This Bill stipulates that the number of attempts 
that the surrogate mother can be subjected to will be “as prescribed”, but instead of rules 
under this Bill, it is more appropriate to regulate such medical protocols through the 
ART Bill. Moreover, Section 3 (vi) mentions compliance with the Medical Termination 
of Pregnancy Act, 1971, but is silent on the phenomenon of “foetal reduction” where 
multiple pregnancies are reduced to a singleton or twins, a practice that is fairly common 
in pregnancies induced by IVF, including gestational surrogacy.
Last but not the least, in a techno-intensive mode of reproduction it is imperative that 
there are safeguards for the children born of surrogacy. However, it has not been 
adequately included in this Bill. The Bill is silent on whether there should be any genetic 
link between the intending couple and the child. Many jurisdictions29 around the world 
that permit surrogacy insist on such a link, with at least one of the intending parents.30 In 
fact, the Law Commission of India in its 2009 report on the subject required this in its 
recommendations (para 4.2[1]).31 There is a need to include provisions for the child to 
29For example, Canada and Australia require that at least one of the intending parents have a genetic link to the child 
born out of surrogacy. With transnational surrogacy, they often require proof of such link in the form of DNA test results. 
See, K Lozanski, ‘Transnational surrogacy: Canada’s contradictions’ [2015] 124 Social Science & Medicine 383–390 and 
Australian High Commission in New Delhi, ‘Children born through Surrogacy Arrangements applying for Australian 
Citizenship by Descent ‘ (Australian High Commission New Delhi India, Bhutan) <https://india.embassy.gov.au/ndli/vm_ 
surrogacy.html> accessed 28 July 2020.
30The RSC recommends that there be a genetic link between the child and the intending mother or intending couple. 
p. 26.
31228th Law Commission of India Report, Need for Legislation to Regulate Assisted Reproductive Technology Clinics as 
well as Rights and Obligations of Parties to a Surrogacy (2009)<http://lawcommissionofindia.nic.in/reports/report228. 
pdf> accessed 1 August 2020.
INDIAN LAW REVIEW 7
have a right to know the identity of the surrogate mother or the individual donating 
gametes (if relevant) in the surrogacy procedure. A child’s right to know is an established 
human rights principle in the context of adoption, and increasingly relevant with the 
expanded use of reproductive technologies. It is in consonance with the spirit of “best 
interests of the child” and derived from Articles 7 and 8 of the Convention on the Rights 
of the Child.32
Further, the Bill needs to deal more comprehensively with scenarios where a child 
born from surrogacy is not accepted by the intending parents. Section 2(a) defines an 
abandoned child as one that is born out of surrogacy, has been deserted by the intending 
parents or guardians and has been declared as abandoned by the appropriate authority. 
What exactly happens when such a child is abandoned? While this contingency was 
provided for in previous drafts of the ART Bill (2020 ART Bill also simply prohibits it, 
without defining what happens in case the eventuality does occur), the current Bill does 
not address it. Will the procedure set forth in Sections 30, 32 and 38 of the Juvenile Justice 
(Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 (JJA) then be activated so that the aban-
doned child is produced before the Child Welfare Committee and declared legally free for 
adoption?33 Or given that the surrogate is a close relative of the intending parents, will 
there be further provisions for the extended family of the surrogate and the intending 
parents to adopt the child? Will intending parents or guardians also be penalized under 
Section 75 of the JJA which prohibits cruelty by biological parents or will they have an 
exemption like biological parents where this is due to circumstances beyond their 
control?
Restrictive eligibility criteria
Surrogacy is a novel mode of reproduction for individuals and couples, irrespective of 
their fertility conditions. To limit the ethical use of surrogacy to compelling circum-
stances or “medically indicated” cases, the law must lay down eligibility criteria for those 
who may be allowed to use it – delineating physiological (e.g. infertility or other medical 
conditions that may prevent a pregnancy) as well as social parameters (e.g. sexual 
orientation, marital status etc.). The Bill, however, lays down highly restrictive criteria. 
Section 2(p) defines infertility as “the inability to conceive after five years of unprotected 
coitus or other proven medical condition preventing a couple from conception.” This 
contradicts the definition of infertility in the 2020 ART Bill and also international 
standards, e.g. the World Health Organization (WHO) defines it as “a disease of the 
reproductive system defined by the failure to achieve a clinical pregnancy after 12 months 
or more of regular unprotected sexual intercourse.”34 Conditions such as the absence of 
32K O’Donovan, ‘A Right To Know One’s Parentage?’ [1988] 2(1) International Journal of Law, Policy and the Family 27–45; 
KS, Rotabi, and others, ‘Regulating Commercial Global Surrogacy: The Best Interests of the Child’ [2017] 2 J Hum Rights 
Soc Work 64–73.
33If this is the case, the definition of “abandoned child” under Section 2 of the Juvenile Justice Act, 2015 must be 
amended to include not just biological or adoptive parents or guardians but also intending parents or guardians.
34See the clinical definition of infertility by the WHO at: https://www.who.int/reproductivehealth/topics/infertility/defini 
tions/en/. Further, Section 2 (g) stipulates that couple “means the legally married Indian man and woman above the age 
of 21 years and 18 years respectively”. This needs to be read along with Section 2 (r) which defines “intending couple” as 
a couple who have been medically certified to be an infertile couple and who intend to become parents through 
surrogacy and Section 4(iii)(c)(I) wherein the age of the intending couple is between 23 to 50 years in case of female 
and between 26 to 55 years in case of male on the day of certification.
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a uterus and other medical conditions that prevent carrying a pregnancy to term have not 
been covered by the Bill as exceptions.
Furthermore, Section 4(ii) delineates the purposes for which surrogacy can be under-
taken. Section 4(ii)(e) includes “any other condition or disease as may be specified by 
regulations made by the Board.” This ground is vague and needs to be brought in line 
with Section 2(p) which defines “infertility” as including “any proven medical condition 
preventing a couple from conception.”35 Intending couples are also required to be 
childless according to this Bill, with the exception of section 4(iii)(c)(III) which allows 
surrogacy if such couple has a “child and who is mentally or physically challenged”. This 
is highly problematic in its framing as it is tantamount to implying that having differently 
abled children is as good as having none at all, and should not find a place in any 
progressive legislation.36
The Bill also permits surrogacy only for heterosexual couples who have been married 
for five years. As the law in India, as articulated by the courts, moves towards recognizing 
and deliberating upon other forms of coupledom such as cohabitation and “relationships 
in the nature of marriage”,37 this Bill takes one step backwards. When it comes to the 
form of a couple’s relationship, the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 
2005 offers protection to women who may live or have lived in a shared household in 
a “relationship in the nature of marriage.” The Assisted Reproductive Technologies Bill, 
2010 similarly defined the term “couple” to cover two persons living in India and having 
a sexual relationship that was legal in India, thus allowing them to commission surrogacy.
In terms of who can become a surrogate, Section 4 (iii) (b) (II) of the Bill allows only 
women who are “close relatives” of the intending parents to become surrogates. 
However, in a glaring gap, the Bill does not define the term “close relative”. To begin 
with, the requirement that the surrogate be a close relative drastically limits the number 
of women who can potentially carry the pregnancy for the intending couple. Since the 
close relative has to be between 25 and 35 years of age and be married with a child under 
section 4(iii) (b) (I), such a close relative is likely to be a sister (either a sibling or a first 
cousin), or the wife of either of their brothers, or their niece (through a sibling or cousin). 
Yet, given that infertility can result from several genetically transmitted medical condi-
tions, the pool of close relatives will likely be further restricted to relatives from the family 
of the spouse who does not suffer from infertility. These restricted eligibility criteria will 
inevitably frustrate the surrogacy option for many couples, hence there is a need to revisit 
this requirement.38
35Interestingly, the RSC recommended the deletion of Section 2(p) of the Bill which defined infertility as the inability to 
conceive after 5 years of unprotected coitus, and did away with the need for medical certification of infertility. Medical 
indication for gestational surrogacy was sufficient and this has to be certified under Section 4(iii)(A)(I), para 4.20–21, 
p. 25.
36The debates on disability and rights of the disabled include discussions on the critical importance of recognizing their 
personhood, strongly rooted in principles of human rights. See, E De Schauwer and others, ‘Desiring and critiquing 
humanity/ability/personhood: disrupting the ability/disability binary’ [2020] Disability & Society [Online], 16 March; 
P. Mittler, ‘UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities: Implementing a Paradigm Shift.’ [2015] 12 (2) 
Journal of Policy and Practice in Intellectual Disabilities 79–89. Moreover, such a provision in the Bill is in direct 
contravention of The Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016 that guarantees equality and non-discrimination for 
the disabled including a right to “life with dignity and respect for his or her integrity equally with others” in section 3(1).
37D.Velusamy v D.Patchaiammal [2010], CA2028-2029(SC).
38Possibly heeding the impracticability of these suggestions, the RSC has recommended the removal of this restriction. 
Any willing woman meeting the age criteria of the Bill can become a surrogate under Section 4(iii)(b); para 4.53, p. 31.
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Importantly, the restricted eligibility criteria for intending parents and surrogates 
envisaged under the Bill are open to challenge on constitutional grounds, especially 
discrimination and violation of the right to privacy. Firstly, single men and women, 
cohabiting heterosexual couples and same-sex couples, who are not allowed to commission 
surrogacy under the Bill can challenge the Bill as discriminatory for violating their rights to 
equality and equal protection before the law under Article 14 of the Constitution. For any 
legislative classification to be reasonable under Article 14 of the Constitution, the classifica-
tion must be founded on intelligible differentia and the differentia must have a rational 
nexus to the objective sought to be achieved by the legislation.39 The Bill permits only 
heterosexual, married couples to commission surrogacy when infertile and thus form their 
families. It does not afford single men and women, heterosexual co-habiting couples and 
same-sex couples this option. These differentiae seem intelligible in an empirical sense but 
not a normative sense. On what basis can a heterosexual married couple be considered to be 
inherently capable of being a parent and forming a family whereas a single person or 
cohabiting couple or same-sex couple cannot do the same?
Further, the differentia have no rational nexus with the objective of the Bill which is to 
“constitute National Surrogacy Board, State Surrogacy Boards and appointment of appro-
priate authorities for regulation of the practice and process of surrogacy and for matters 
connected therewith or incidental thereto.” The Bill might seek to regulate surrogacy by 
limiting its availability to a narrow sliver of commissioning parents; however, this differ-
entiation between who can be a commissioning parent and who cannot, has no rational 
nexus with regulating surrogacy. Restricting surrogacy to heterosexual married couples 
does not help regulate surrogacy better than if it were available to single men and women, 
cohabiting couples and same-sex couples. Moreover, single women are allowed to adopt 
under the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act, 1956. Single and divorced persons are 
allowed to adopt children as per Section 57 of the Juvenile Justice Act, 2015.40 The 2005 
ICMR guidelines also permitted a single woman to be an intending parent.41 Finally, 
Section 3(e) of the Transgender Persons (Protection of Rights) Act, 2019 requires that 
transgender persons not be discriminated against in terms of “access to, or provision or 
enjoyment or use of any goods, accommodation, service, facility, benefit, privilege or 
opportunity dedicated to the use of the general public or customarily available to the 
public.” Hence denial of surrogacy services to transgender persons will violate the 2019 Act.
In relation to same-sex couples, it is noteworthy that when the Ministry of External 
Affairs introduced a surrogacy visa in 2012 for foreign commissioning couples, gay 
couples were excluded on the basis that the constitutional status of Section 377 of the 
Indian Penal Code, 1860, which criminalized “sex against the order of nature” was 
unclear.42 At that time, the Delhi High Court had read down Section 377 as being 
39The State Of West Bengal v Anwar Ali Sarkar 1952 AIR 75.
40Arijeet Ghosh and Nitika Khaitan, ‘A Womb of One’s Own: Privacy and Reproductive Rights’ [2017] 52(42–43), Economic 
& Political Weekly (EPW Engage), [Online] <https://www.epw.in/engage/article/womb-ones-own-privacy-and- 
reproductive-rights>, accessed 9 September 2020.
41Unfortunately, here the Select Committee favoured only widowed and divorced women between the ages of 35 and 45 as 
eligible to pursue surrogacy provided they obtained a certificate from the National Surrogacy Board upon application. 
A couple of Indian origin also have to obtain a certificate from the National Surrogacy Board; para 4.24, p. 25.
42Section 377 read as follows: 377. Unnatural offences – Whoever voluntarily has carnal intercourse against the order of 
nature with any man, woman or animal, shall be punished with 1[imprisonment for life], or with imprisonment of either 
description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine. Explanation – Penetration is 
sufficient to constitute the carnal intercourse necessary to the offence described in this section.
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unconstitutional but that the decision was pending appeal before the Supreme Court.43 
However, the legal landscape has dramatically shifted since then. The criminalization of 
consensual sexual activity between adults of the same sex by Section 377 has now been 
held to be unconstitutional for violating Articles 14, 15, 19 and 21 of the Indian 
Constitution.44 The transformative power of the Indian Constitution and the triumph 
of constitutional morality over social morality are being marshalled to campaign for 
equality for LGBT persons in all walks of life including in marriage and specifically for 
same-sex marriage.45 The Supreme Court itself observed in Navtej Johar that the right to 
privacy included the right to union and companionship, with Justice Dhananjaya 
Chandrachud observing that:
The constitutional principles which have led to decriminalization must continuously engage 
in a rights discourse to ensure that same-sex relationships find true fulfillment in every facet 
of life. The law cannot discriminate against same-sex relationships. It must also take positive 
steps to achieve equal protection.46
The Bill must therefore embrace the decision in Navtej Johar in letter and spirit by 
allowing same-sex couples to avail of surrogacy. Further, the Supreme Court has held that 
a law can be held to violate Article 14 when it is manifestly arbitrary. In Shayara Bano 
v Union of India, Justice Rohinton F. Nariman held that
Manifest arbitrariness, therefore, must be something done by the legislature capriciously, 
irrationally and/or without adequate determining principle. Also, when something is done 
which is excessive and disproportionate, such legislation would be manifestly arbitrary. We 
are, therefore, of the view that arbitrariness in the sense of manifest arbitrariness as pointed 
out by us above would apply to negate legislation as well under Article 14.47
The Bill’s restrictions on who can commission surrogacy are likely to fall foul of Article 
14 on this count of manifest arbitrariness as well.
Secondly, there have recently been significant shifts in the right to privacy jurispru-
dence under the Indian Constitution. Admittedly, there is no explicit right to reproduc-
tion protected under the Indian Constitution. However, in B.K. Parthasarthi 
v Government of Andhra Pradesh,48 the Andhra Pradesh High Court upheld the “right 
of reproductive autonomy” of an individual as a facet of the “right to privacy” which is 
protected under Article 21 of the Indian Constitution. This reading was recently reiter-
ated by the Supreme Court in Puttaswamy v Union of India, where it held that “a 
woman’s freedom of choice whether to bear a child or abort her pregnancy are areas 
which fall in the realm of privacy” (Justice Chelamaswar, para. 38).49 The majority also 
noted that:
‘the sanctity of marriage, the liberty of procreation, the choice of a family life and the dignity 
of being are matters which concern every individual irrespective of social strata or economic 
43Naz Foundation v Government of NCT Delhi, 2009 S.C.C. OnLine Del 1762; the decision on appeal was rendered in Suresh 
Kumar Koushal v Naz Foundation, (2014) 1 S.C.C. 1.
44Navtej Singh Johar v Union of India (2018) 10 S.C.C. 1.
45See Oxford Union Address by Menaka Guruswamy and Arundhati Katju, [Online] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=- 
Lp6H4YYN-k accessed 9 September 2020
46Navtej Singh Johar v Union of India (2018) 10 S.C.C. 1, 185.
47Shayara Bano v Union of India (2017) 9 SCC 1, 262.
48B.K. Parthasarthi v Government of Andhra Pradesh [2000] 1 ALD 199.
49Puttaswamy v Union of India [2017] Writ Petition Civ 494/12,(SC) (hereafter ‘Puttaswamy’).
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well-being. The pursuit of happiness is founded upon autonomy and dignity. Both are 
essential attributes of privacy, which makes no distinction between the birth marks of 
individuals’ (majority, para. 157).50
The provisions of the Bill can therefore be challenged by single men and women, 
cohabiting heterosexual couples and same-sex couples for violating their reproductive 
autonomy, dignity and right to privacy under Article 21 of the Constitution. Needless to 
say, the state can place restrictions on the right to privacy to protect its legitimate 
interests but only if it meets the three point test set out by Justice Chandrachud in this 
decision, namely, that there be a law, second, that the law is reasonable rather than 
manifestly arbitrary and finally, that the means which are adopted by the legislature are 
proportional to the object and needs sought to be fulfilled by the law. Given the liberal-
izing nature of relationships and family forms in India today, a fact recognized by Indian 
courts from time to time, the state would be hard-pressed to argue that the purpose of the 
Bill, which is to regulate the practice and process of surrogacy can be better met by 
restricting surrogacy only to heterosexual married couples. The Bill restricts the repro-
ductive autonomy of groups other than such married couples and this restriction is 
neither reasonable nor proportional to satisfying the law’s objectives. Commentators 
have thus observed that the Bill may have an uphill task meeting the just, fair and 
reasonable standard required for laws that restrict the right to privacy.51
Admittedly, surrogacy is unique when compared to other cases of reproductive rights 
wherein women typically assert their right to privacy vis-à-vis the state. In the case of 
surrogacy, the rights of the intending parents to form a family sit alongside the repro-
ductive autonomy of the surrogate to have a baby on her terms even if it is governed by 
a contractual arrangement with the intending parents. This relationship is likely to be 
a highly unequal one. In this context, the state’s insistence on altruistic surrogacy might 
appear to be a valid restriction on the reproductive autonomy of the surrogate in the 
interests of preventing commercialization from which third parties benefit at the expense 
of the surrogate. In reality however, requiring altruistic surrogacy in the absence of 
compensation to her for her reproductive labour and without corresponding protections 
for the surrogate under the Bill in fact amounts to an unreasonable and disproportionate 
encroachment on the surrogate’s reproductive autonomy. Thus it violates the surrogate’s 
right to privacy under Article 21 as the restriction is not just, fair and reasonable. As 
Dipika Jain and Payal Shah have argued, it is only by enhancing reproductive rights while 
paying attention to gender equality (by side-stepping gender stereotypes)52 and to 
structural factors that undermine women’s access to health more generally that 
50In another case Javed v State of Haryana (AIR 2003 SC 3057) however, dealing with electoral laws that bar individuals 
with more than two children from contesting elections to local bodies (panchayats), the Supreme Court upheld this 
restriction on the right to reproduce on the basis that it was justified for ‘socio- economic welfare and health care of the 
masses’ and ‘consistent with the national population policy’. This judgement was however rendered prior to the 
Puttaswamy decision; the Supreme Court’s judgement in Puttaswamy would be binding in future cases relating to 
autonomy in matters of reproduction.
51Arijeet Ghosh and Nitika Khaitan, ‘A Womb of One’s Own: Privacy and Reproductive Rights’ [2017] 52(42–43) Economic 
& Political Weekly (EPW Engage), [Online] <https://www.epw.in/engage/article/womb-ones-own-privacy-and- 
reproductive-rights> accessed 9 September 2020. Also, Aparna Chandra argues that the Bill limits surrogacy not 
based on scientific data, but on conceptions of “public morality”-such as age criteria, number of pre-existing children of 
the commissioning parents and marital status of the parties. See, Aparna Chandra, ‘Privacy and Women’s Rights’ [2017] 
52(51) Economic & Political Weekly, 46–50.
52Surrogacy does defy gender stereotypes to the extent that it decouples birthing from the responsibilities of social 
motherhood.
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reproductive justice can be achieved.53 Using gender stereotypes that naturalize women’s 
reproductive labour as divine ignores the structural inequalities that mediate 
a surrogate’s performance of such labour. The Bill reinforces these stereotypes while 
paying lip-service to addressing structural inequalities.
Beyond altruistic vs. commercial surrogacy: “compensated surrogacy” and the 
prevention of exploitation
Globally, there have been polarized debates on whether surrogacy should be altruistic or 
commercial. Notwithstanding this distinction, all surrogacy arrangements are ultimately 
contractual where the intending couple and the surrogate enter into an agreement. It is 
perplexing that in the Bill there is no mention of a contract between the intending couple 
and the surrogate mother. Section 6(1) specifies the need for written informed consent 
from the surrogate mother, but this is limited to medical procedures and side-effects. 
A more expansive contract or agreement is needed to govern the arrangement, clearly 
spelling out the rights and duties of each party, namely, the intending couple and 
surrogate mother, including but not limited to the medical procedures involved. 
Moreover, although Sections 2 (b) and (f) mention “surrogate mother or her dependents 
or her representative”, they do not specify who can represent her or under what condi-
tions. For a Bill with a stated objective of preventing the exploitation of surrogate 
mothers, exclusion of the provision for a contract is a serious omission.
The Bill seeks to ban commercial surrogacy and opts for altruistic arrangements 
allowing only for payment of medical expenses and insurance coverage for the 
surrogate.54 However, only reimbursing costs or expenses incurred is not sufficient in 
lieu of the time and effort that the surrogate devotes to the process. In fact, the PSC 
pointed out that “permitting women to provide reproductive labour for free to another 
person but preventing them from being paid for their reproductive labour is grossly 
unfair and arbitrary.” (para 5.18). It further noted that “the altruistic surrogacy model as 
proposed in the Bill is based more on moralistic assumptions than on any scientific 
criteria and all kinds of value judgments have been injected into it in a paternalistic 
manner.” (para 5.22)
Adopting a pragmatic and rights-based approach, the PSC recommended:
The Committee is of the view that medical expenses incurred on surrogate mother and the 
insurance coverage for the surrogate mother are not the only expenses incurred during the 
surrogacy pregnancy. For any woman who is going through surrogacy, there is a certain cost 
and certain loss of health involved. Not only will she be absent from her work, but will also 
be away from her husband and would not be able to look after her own children. The 
Committee, therefore, recommends that surrogate mother should be adequately and reason-
ably compensated. The quantum of compensation should be fixed keeping in mind the 
surrogacy procedures and other necessary expenses related to and arising out of surrogacy 
process. The compensation should be commensurate with the lost wages for the duration of 
53D Jain and P Shah, ‘Reimagining Reproductive Rights Jurisprudence in India: Reflections on the Recent Decisions on 
Privacy And Gender Equality From the Supreme Court Of India’ [2020] 39(2) Columbia Journal of Gender And Law 1–53, 
p. 6.
54Sections 2(b) and 2(f) of the Bill which define altruistic and commercial surrogacy mention this along with a prohibition 
of remuneration of any kind. However, these sections are ambiguous as to whether the surrogate mother is to be 
reimbursed for the medical costs or if the intending couple will take care of all the costs directly.
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pregnancy, medical screening and psychological counselling of surrogate; child care support 
or psychological counselling for surrogate mother’s own child/children, dietary supplements 
and medication, maternity clothing and post-delivery care. (para 5.24)
In contrast, the RSC concurred with the approach of the Bill. It observed:
Compensatory surrogacy gives rise to some of the teasing questions:- whether there could be 
or should be any compensation for the noble act of motherhood; how much compensation 
could be treated as condign (sic) for a woman who agrees to rent her womb; whether any 
standard price or cost for this noble act of motherhood could be fixed, whether renting out 
of her womb by a woman for some material consideration could be considered as an ethical 
practice and the woman would get the same respect as other women and mothers get in the 
society. The appropriate and judicious response to all these questions appears to be in the 
negative and it is in this background that the most acceptable option for surrogacy is the 
altruistic one . . . At the heart of the altruistic surrogacy lies the fact that it is bereft of any 
commercial consideration, it is a social and noble act of highest level. The surrogate 
mother . . . willfully and voluntarily resolves to do something worthwhile for the society 
and she, instead of being considered as getting involved in an immoral and unethical 
practice, sets an example of being a model woman in the society indulging in altruistic 
and selfless service as other normal mothers do . . . ” (para 4.9)
The RSC recommended that the Bill allow for the payment of additional expenditure to 
cover nutritional food and maternity clothing for the surrogate which are “vital for the 
well-being and upkeep” of the surrogate but did not itemize it unlike the PSC. Further, 
while the PSC recognizes the reproductive labour of the surrogate as such, the RSC bases 
its arguments on gendered stereotypes of “ideal” motherhood thus glorifying women’s 
labour but at the same time devaluing it. Even when the RSC refers to the PSC report on 
other matters, it differs on the question of compensation. In its deification of women as 
mothers, exalting surrogate mothers for their altruism by the very fact of agreeing to act 
as one, the RSC sets aside a vital argument that the PSC report had highlighted: the labour 
in surrogacy, notwithstanding the inherent nobility and altruism on the part of women 
who act as surrogates. An important extension of the argument by the PSC is that 
compensation for the work of surrogates is a better way of recognizing their contribution 
than mere exaltation. In any case, merely eliminating the provision for a fee or remu-
neration for the surrogate, does little to make surrogacy non-commercial, in a context 
where surrogacy is provisioned almost exclusively in the private healthcare sector by 
a multi-million dollar ART industry. Compensating the surrogate, whether she is an 
unrelated consenting woman, a “close relative” or a “willing woman” is only fair 
recognition of work, far from commercialization.
Finally, the Bill’s provisions on uncompensated surrogacy are likely to violate Article 
23 of the Constitution.55 In determining whether it indeed violates Article 23, the main 
question is whether giving birth to a child amounts to reproductive labour and whether 
engaging in this form of labour without any compensation (which the Bill requires) does 
not amount to begar or forced labour. Indian courts have in various contexts acknowl-
edged that the act of bearing a child is reproductive labour. Pertinent here is a long line of 
55Prohibition of traffic in human beings and forced labour (1) Traffic in human beings and begar and other similar forms 
of forced labour are prohibited and any contravention of this provision shall be an offence punishable in accordance 
with law. (2) Nothing in this article shall prevent the State from imposing compulsory service for public purpose, and in 
imposing such service the State shall not make any discrimination on grounds only of religion, race, caste or class or any 
of them.
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cases on the status of the unpaid domestic and care work of housewives and how courts 
compensate dependents for such labour under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 when the 
housewife dies. In National Insurance Co. Ltd. v Minor Deepika 200956 which came up 
before the Madras High Court, Justice Prabha Sridevan remarked on how unpaid 
domestic and care work was the foundation of human experience and how it must be 
valued by the courts by providing compensation to the deceased housewife’s daughter 
(Paragraph 9). This line of reasoning was confirmed by the Supreme Court in 2010 in the 
case of Arun Kumar Agarwal57wherein the court noted the range of tasks that 
a housewife engages in, including the cooking of food, washing of clothes and teaching 
of small children. While the focus of the courts in these decisions was on unpaid care 
work, they also implicitly recognized the reproductive labour performed by mothers in 
bearing children, sometimes awarding compensation for the loss of a foetus. Moreover, 
in several cases which discussed surrogacy such as the Baby Manji case58 and the Jan 
Balaz case,59 contracts for commercial surrogacy were not held to be illegal thus offering 
implicit recognition of the reproductive labour of surrogates. Therefore, there are 
adequate grounds for considering the labour of bearing and giving birth to children as 
labour for purposes of Indian law.
We then need to ask whether provisions of the Bill which allow unremunerated 
surrogacy by a close relative of the intending couple (or for that matter of any “willing 
woman”, as the RSC recommended and the government has since accepted according to 
media accounts60) would amount to begar or forced labour thus violating Article 23 of 
the Indian Constitution. Indian courts have held that “begar” requires showing “that the 
person has been forced to work against his will and without payment.”61 The level of 
force required here is high such that it negates the will of the individual. To understand 
what is meant by force, consider PUDR v Union of India,62 also referred to as the Asiad 
Games case, where Justice Bhagwati elaborated on the meaning of the term “force” under 
Article 23 of the Constitution and concluded that “any factor which deprives a person of 
a choice of alternatives and compels him to adopt one particular course of action may 
properly be regarded as ‘force’ and if labour or service is compelled as a result of such 
‘force’, it would be ‘forced labour’.”63 Since only a person suffering from hunger or 
starvation would accept a job where the remuneration is less than the minimum wage, the 
court reasoned that any labour remunerated at a level less than the minimum wage would 
be considered to be forced labour under Article 23. This interpretation of force has been 
reiterated by the Supreme Court in a long line of cases including under the Mahatma 
Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act, 2005. Although the interpretation of 
force has been elucidated by the courts in relation to market forces which men are 
typically subject to, we could equally apply this structural understanding of force to 
56MANU/TN [2009] 1304.
57Arun Kumar Agarwal v National Insurance Company [2010] 9 SCC 218
58Baby Manji Yamada v Union of India (UOI) and Anr AIR [2009] SC 84.
59Union of India & Anr v Jan Balaz and others [2009] SLA Civ 31639 (SC); Union of India & Anr v Jan Balaz and others [2010] 
CA 8714 SC.
60HT Correspondent, ‘Rajya Sabha panel recommendations get Cabinet nod’ The Hindustan Times (Delhi, 
27 February 2020) [Online] https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/rajya-sabha-panel-recommendations-get- 
cabinet-nod/story-itB4FkNggJq0qnNfoCY6FM.html
61Ram Khelwan Pathak v State of U.P., [1998] 2 AWC 1171.
62People’s Union for Democratic Rights v Union of India, AIR [1982] SC 1473.
63ibid, para 5.10.
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coercion applied by family members in a patriarchal society such as India, where the rate 
of marriage for women is 94.8%64 and families exert considerable power over their lives 
and reproductive decisions.
If close relatives of the intending couple, especially sisters-in-law or daughters-in-law 
are persuaded to reproduce not only for their nuclear family but also for the extended 
family in order to preserve their marital life, the levels of social pressure experienced by 
them can be of a similar nature to that exercised by the market on male labourers. Indeed, 
Section 39 of the Bill presumes such coercion. The proposed Trafficking of Persons 
(Prevention, Protection and Rehabilitation) Bill 2018 (which was passed by the lower 
house of the Indian Parliament in July 2018 and lapsed before being introduced in the 
Rajya Sabha) also incorporates a specific offence of aggravated trafficking punishing any 
person who traffics a woman for the purpose of bearing a child by natural means or 
through the use of ARTs.65 Irrespective of familial ties between the intending parents and 
the surrogate, it is exploitative to expect women to perform reproductive labour without 
being adequately compensated for it. Further, with no payment allowed for in the Bill, 
these women will be performing reproductive labour for less than the minimum wage 
attracting the application of Article 23 of the Constitution.66 Admittedly, compensation 
is not an antidote to coercion but as the Supreme Court has noted, coercion is endemic, 
whether in the labour market or in marriage, and compensation can keep impermissible 
levels of exploitation at bay.
Criminalizing surrogacy
A heavily criticized aspect of the Bill is its excessive reliance on criminalization to prevent 
commercial surrogacy. Section 40 designates that “offences under this Act shall be 
cognizable, non-bailable and non-compoundable.” Section 35 of the Bill seeks to crim-
inalize a range of processes and actors related to surrogacy, namely, doctors, owners of 
surrogacy clinics, other intermediaries or “any person” engaged in commercial surro-
gacy, advertising for it, sale of embryo or gametes for surrogacy, their import or 
conducting sex selection as part of surrogacy. Section 35(2) specifies a minimum man-
datory punishment of ten years and with fine up to ten lakh rupees. Section 36 delineates 
64G Raveendran, The Indian Labour Market: A Gender Perspective Discussion Paper for Progress of the World’s Women 
2015–2016 (UN Women 2016) 11.
65The draft provision s. 5 reads as follows:‘5. Trafficking for the purpose of bearing child. – Notwithstanding anything 
contained in any other law for the time being in force, whoever commits the offence of trafficking of a person for the 
purpose of bearing child either naturally or through assisted reproductive techniques for commercial purposes, shall be 
punished with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than ten years, but which may extend to life 
imprisonment and shall also be liable to fine which shall not be less than one lakh rupees.’ Available at https:// 
www.prsindia.org/sites/default/files/bill_files/The%20Trafficking%20of%20Persons%20%28Prevention%2C% 
20Protection%20and%20Rehabilitation%29%20Bill%2C%202018.pdf The base offence for this aggravated offence of 
trafficking lies in Section 370 of the Indian Penal Code where a person is trafficked by coercive means (including the use 
of threats, the use of force, or any other form of coercion, abduction, the use of fraud, or deception, or the abuse of 
power, or inducement, including the giving or receiving of payments or benefits, in order to achieve the consent of any 
person having control over the person recruited) for purposes of exploitation (“any act of physical exploitation or any 
form of sexual exploitation, slavery or practices similar to slavery, servitude, or the forced removal of organs.”). The fact 
that the Trafficking Bill visualizes women who are trafficked by market intermediaries for producing a child must alert 
us to the fact that similar levels of coercion can be exerted by the family as well, resulting in the exploitation of women.
66In fact, a constitutional expert Gautam Bhatia has made a similar argument to characterize the unpaid labour of women 
as forced labour under Art. 23. See Bhatia, The Transformative Constitution A Radical Biography in Nine Acts 
(HarperCollins India 2019) 210–211.
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punishments for medical practitioners and clinic owners, or persons employed by them 
for any contravention of the provisions of the Bill that are not addressed in section 35, 
namely, imprisonment for five years with fine of up to ten lakh rupees. Subsequent 
offences can potentially result in suspension of registration of the medical practitioner. 
Section 37 meanwhile punishes intending couples and other individuals initiating com-
mercial surrogacy with a minimum mandatory imprisonment of five years and with fine 
which may extend to five lakh rupees for the first offence and higher punishments for 
subsequent offences. At the outset, these punishments are disproportionately high when 
compared to punishments in surrogacy laws around the world.67 For example, in Israel 
and New Zealand, the highest punishment for violation of the surrogacy laws are no 
more than one year’s imprisonment.
The high level of criminalization under the Bill is consonant with the Indian state’s 
efforts over the past decade to don a paternalist mantle and introduce draconian laws 
against sexual violence, especially rape, child sex abuse and trafficking. These crimes are 
considered to be mala in se (wrong in itself) but the laws themselves have been ineffective 
at best, often generating unintended consequences and undermining women’s sexual 
autonomy and freedom of movement.68 Well before this carceral turn, the Indian state 
has long legislated on mala prohibita (wrong because they are prohibited) offences.69 
These include offences under the Immoral Traffic Prevention Act, 1986 where the activity 
of selling sexual services itself is not a crime but its commercialization through the 
involvement of third parties is. Surrogacy is another such activity where under the Bill, 
altruistic surrogacy is permitted but not its commercialization. There is however an 
extensive literature documenting how this schizophrenic approach to the sale of services 
produces considerable ambiguity in the minds of enforcement officials thus generating 
social stigma and high economic and penal costs borne by the most vulnerable actors in 
the industry, namely, the women themselves.70
67Unfortunately, the RSC in its zeal to curb commercial surrogacy suggests that Section 38 be expanded to cover 
omissions to pursue altruistic surrogacy (p. 61) which if accepted would introduce considerable ambiguity in the law 
while also violating general principles for imposition of criminal liability.
68Prabha Kotiswaran, The Carceral Politics of Sexual Violence: Notes on a Political Economy of Criminal Law, Second 
Annual Project 39A Lecture, National Law University Delhi, 2019; Preeti Pratishruti Dash, ‘Rape adjudication in India in 
the aftermath of Criminal Law Amendment Act, 2013: findings from trial courts of Delhi, [2020] 4(2) Indian Law Review, 
244-266; Partners for Law in Development, Why Girls Run Away To Marry – Adolescent Realities And Socio Legal Responses 
In India, 2019, available at https://www.academia.edu/40718265/WHY_GIRLS_RUN_AWAY_TO_MARRY_ADOLESCENT_ 
REALITIES_AND_SOCIO-LEGAL_RESPONSES_IN_INDIA; Raided: How Anti-Trafficking Strategies Increase Sex Workers’ 
Vulnerability to Exploitative Practices, SANGRAM. Available online at http://sangram.org/resources/RAIDED-E-Book.pdf
69This distinction has long been debated by philosophers and scholars of criminal law; whether an offence is mala in se or 
mala prohibita often turns on whether the act is intrinsically morally wrong. This distinction is not the focus of the 
research at hand, but we find compelling philosopher Susan Dimock’s argument where she draws on social contract 
theory to define mala in se offences as offences involving “conduct that must be prohibited in any society united for 
mutual benefit on terms that are fair to all.” Mala prohibita offences on the other hand are “those wrongs that offend 
against rights and duties assumed by participants within valuable social practices, when participants are tempted to 
violate the rights of others or to neglect their own duties and doing so would undermine the practice or deprive it of its 
value.” Thus, insider trading is a mala prohibita offence that a society may (rather than must) choose to criminalize. 
S Dimock, ’The Malum prohibitum-Malum in se Distinction and the Wrongfulness Constraint on Criminalization’ [2016] 
55(2) Dialogue 1–24, see pp 15, 21. Selling sexual services for money or bearing a baby for a couple in exchange for 
money are in our view similar examples.
70P Kotiswaran, Dangerous Sex, Invisible Labor: Sex Work and the Law in India (Princeton 2011); Amnesty International. 
2016a. Policy on State Obligations to Respect, Protect and Fulfil the Human Rights of Sex Workers. Pol 30/4062/2016; 
Amnesty International. 2016b. Explanatory Note on Amnesty International’s Policy on State Obligations to Respect, 
Protect and Fulfil the Human Rights of Sex Workers. Index: POL 30/4063/2016; Amnesty International, 2016c. Sex 
Workers at Risk: A Research Summary on Human Rights Abuses Against Sex Workers. Index: POL 40/4061/2016.
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The unintended consequences of criminalization including their ability to create 
a push-down pop-up effect and the mushrooming of underground markets are well- 
documented and must be heeded before adopting a highly carceral approach to com-
mercial surrogacy.71 Consider Section 35(1)(a) which outlaws “individual brokers or 
intermediaries to arrange for surrogate mothers and for surrogacy procedures”. 
However, their individually-driven informal networks have spread across the country 
in the last decade, mostly through expansive word-of-mouth referrals with commission- 
based payments for every node of the network.72 It would be challenging to completely 
dismantle them and gaps in implementation of this provision will result in the emergence 
of illicit black markets. In fact, soon after the first announcements about the prohibition 
of commercial surrogacy were made, there were reports of “surrogacy rackets”73 being 
busted in major Indian cities in 2017. While “raids” and racket-busting may be seen as 
effective implementation, the spread of informal networks that have sustained the 
surrogacy industry for over a decade would be extremely challenging to reign in. 
Reproductive justice scholars have also long demonstrated how an overarching criminal 
regime which prohibits abortion through the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) with 
exceptions (in the form of the Medical Termination of Pregnancy Act, 1971) in fact 
leads to a chilling effect in women’s ability to access safe abortion on their terms thus 
undermining their bodily autonomy.74 The medically mediated nature of the surrogacy 
sector means that criminalization will adversely affect women’s health. Experience from 
the implementation of the Pre-Conception and Pre-Natal Diagnostic Techniques Act, 
1994 shows that steep punishments and fines impede conviction and present a hurdle in 
the law’s implementation.75
Furthermore, Section 39, a part of which reads as follows, presumes that all surrogates 
are forced into surrogacy thus denying that they are capable of exercising their choice in 
making decisions related to their bodies:
Notwithstanding anything contained in the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, the court shall 
presume, unless the contrary is proved, that the women or surrogate mother was compelled 
by her husband, the intending couple or any other relative, as the case may be, to render 
surrogacy services, procedures or to donate gametes . . .
It could be that Section 39 is effectively a sub-clause of Section 37 (prohibiting the 
intending couple from seeking commercial surrogacy) where it reverses the burden of 
proof. Therefore, in cases where a prosecution is launched under Section 37, the 
71P Marshall and S Thatun, ‘Miles Away: The Trouble with Prevention in the Greater Mekong Sub-region’ in Kamala 
Kempadoo, Jyoti Sanghera and Bandana Pattanaik (eds), Trafficking and Prostitution Reconsidered New Perspectives on 
Migration, Sex Work, and Human Rights (Paradigm Publishers 2005) 44.
72As is evident from the body of rich ethnographic work on the surrogacy industry in India (n 11)
73ANI, ‘Hyd police busts surrogacy racket in hospital; 46 women illegally confined’ Deccan Chronicle, (Hyderabad, 
18 June 2017) [Online] <https://www.deccanchronicle.com/nation/crime/180617/hyderabad-police-bust-illegal- 
surrogacy-racket.html>, accessed 9 September 2020
74Dipika Jain and Brian Tronic, ‘Conflicting abortion laws in India: Unintended barriers to safe abortion for adolescent girls’ 
[2019] 4(4) Indian Journal of Medical Ethics, 310–317; D Jain and P Shah, ‘Reimagining Reproductive Rights 
Jurisprudence In India: Reflections On The Recent Decisions On Privacy And Gender Equality From The Supreme 
Court Of India’ [2020] 39(2) Columbia Journal Of Gender And Law 1–53, 3. See also Dipika Jain, Proposed Changes to 
Abortion Law Continue to Sideline Pregnant Persons, 15 March 2020, <https://science.thewire.in/health/proposed- 
changes-to-abortion-law-continue-to-sideline-pregnant-persons/> accessed 9 September 2020
75G Aravamudan, Disappearing Daughters: The Tragedy of Female Foeticide (Penguin Books 2007), see pp. 99–101 and 
Ravinder Kaur ed., Too Many Men, Too Few Women: Social Consequences of Gender Imbalance in India and China (Orient 
Blackswan 2016), see p. 288.
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intending couple would have to prove that the surrogate was not coerced; this would 
facilitate the conviction of intending couples. However, as it currently reads, it suggests 
that all surrogacy is presumed to be coerced, which frustrates the very purpose of the Bill. 
If the Bill does indeed presume coercion in every instance of surrogacy then it must 
amend section 4(iii)(b) to add an additional ground for issuance of the eligibility 
certificate which states that the appropriate authority must be satisfied that the surrogate 
mother was not compelled by the intending couple.
Finally, section 41 specifies that a court can take cognizance of any offence only when 
a complaint in writing is made by the appropriate authority or where a person or social 
organization has given 15 days’ notice to the appropriate authority of the alleged offence 
and intends to file a complaint. Given that this provision can be misused by competitor 
surrogacy clinics or NGOs acting without adequate information, and the timeframe 
within which the appropriate authority has to take action is short, more safeguards 
must be introduced in this section to prevent frivolous or malicious actions by private 
parties.
In conclusion: lessons for India from the global experience on regulating 
surrogacy
Over the last 40 years or so since the first IVF birth in 1978, many countries have 
regulated the use of ARTs including surrogacy. However, rarely has robust regulation of 
surrogacy come without a complementary regulation of the broader area of ARTs. In 
previous sections, we have demonstrated the pitfalls of attempting the regulation of ARTs 
and surrogacy in silos. We conclude this paper by drawing lessons from the experiences 
of other jurisdictions on surrogacy.
In a recent book offering an overview of surrogacy laws around the world, Jens 
Scherpe, Claire Fenton-Glynn and Terry Kaan76 identify at least four approaches to 
surrogacy worldwide. These include: the prohibitionist approach where almost all aspects 
of surrogacy are prohibited including altruistic surrogacy. Countries in this category 
include France, Germany and Spain. Then, there are tolerationist countries like the UK 
and several provinces in Australia which allow for restricted forms of surrogacy such as 
altruistic surrogacy. With the limited availability of women willing to be surrogates 
however, couples in these countries have looked internationally to hire surrogates to 
complete their families. When they have returned, their governments have been forced to 
tolerate international surrogacy arrangements on pragmatic grounds to protect the “best 
interests of the child.”77 Further, their courts had no possibility of investigating the 
commercial arrangements that their citizens may have entered into abroad. There are 
yet other countries that adopt a regulationist approach towards surrogacy by creating 
a mechanism for the state (often a High Court as in Greece and South Africa or an 
executive agency as in Israel, New Zealand and Portugal) to approve surrogacy before the 
transaction is initiated. Further, Greece allows for compensated surrogacy with an upper 
limit for remuneration and Israel allows for commercial surrogacy. Finally, there are 
76Claire Fenton-Glynn, Terry Kaan and Jens Scherpe (eds), Eastern and Western Perspectives on Surrogacy (Intersentia 
2019).
77This is a universally accepted norm emerging, most notably, from the Convention on the Rights of the Child, 1990. 
Convention on the Rights of the Child, 20 November 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3.
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liberal jurisdictions such as California and Russia which allow for commercial surrogacy 
to be regulated by contracts entered into by the parties without prior state approval.
India fell in the category of liberal countries in the initial years of the growth of the 
ART industry. Since 2016, when India started rethinking its liberal approach to surro-
gacy, there has been a reversal of trends internationally. Countries that once banned both 
altruistic and commercial surrogacy are having to deal with the adverse consequences of 
effectively “exporting” their surrogacy problem. They have therefore felt the need to 
adopt a more pragmatic approach to surrogacy at home. As India considers prohibiting 
commercial surrogacy and allowing the purest form of altruistic surrogacy (where no 
more than medical expenses and insurance costs for loss, damage, illness or death are 
borne by the intending couple), countries like the UK are considering a more permissive 
stance towards surrogacy. Hence, it is crucial for India to consider lessons from tolera-
tionist and regulationist countries when passing laws on ART and surrogacy. Placing 
a high level of restrictions on surrogacy threatens to export the surrogacy market else-
where. Given that the remaining liberal jurisdictions are costly venues for surrogacy, only 
the wealthiest Indians will be able to afford surrogacy, thus leading to a highly inequitable 
scenario regarding access to surrogacy in the country. Moreover, there remains the 
formidable risk of not being able to closely monitor such transactions abroad. Instead, 
we need to return to the National Guidelines for the Accreditation, Supervision and 
Regulation of ART Clinics in India, 2005 issued by the ICMR which had an entire chapter 
(Chapter 7) on providing ART to economically weaker sections of society, including 
through clinics in the public sector, by addressing the high cost of ovarian stimulation 
hormones and reducing dependence on multi-national corporations for these drugs.
Further, several tolerationist and regulationist countries like Israel and South Africa 
have robust written Constitutions (like India) where citizens have litigated the right to 
use surrogacy services as single parents, cohabitating couples in a permanent relationship 
and as same-sex couples. As outlined earlier, the Bill by excluding cohabiting couples,78 
single persons, and same-sex couples79 from pursuing surrogacy violates their right to 
privacy and reproductive autonomy as set out in the 2017 Puttaswamy judgement of the 
Supreme Court. The Indian government must anticipate constitutional challenges on 
these fronts.
Against this backdrop, the recommendations of the RSC on the sheer unworkability of 
the Bill as passed by the Lok Sabha are very welcome. Yet, in recommending the liberal-
ization of the eligibility criteria while retaining altruistic surrogacy, the RSC’s 2020 report 
has muddied the regulatory waters yet again. On the one hand, like the proponents of the 
Bill, the RSC believes that the epitome of Indian motherhood is to reproduce children for 
the market, with “divine warmth and affection,” irrespective of detriment to the well- 
being of one’s self and family, thus valorizing freely provided reproductive labour. On the 
other hand, the inclusion of the term “prescribed expenses” leaves the door half open for 
some form of compensation, especially since the arrangement is not restricted to “close 
78The RSC for instance recommends the modification of Section 4(iii)(c)(I) to make this clear, that the couple be married 
and be between the age of 23 and 50 in the case of the female and between 26 and 55 in the case of the male.
79Note for example, a law suit for the right to marriage initiated by a same-sex couple before the Kerala High Court. Lily 
Wakefield, ‘Indian gay couple who had a stunning temple wedding launch gruelling fight to have marriage legally 
recognised’ Pink News, (29 January 2020) [Online] <https://www.pinknews.co.uk/2020/01/29/kerala-india-gay-couple- 
high-court-same-sex-marriage-ban-illegal-unconstitutional/> accessed 9 September 2020.
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relatives”. Where the Bill seems to frustrate the very possibility of surrogacy through 
stringent eligibility criteria for both the intending parents and the surrogate, with 
restricted payments (medical expenses and insurance coverage) and carried out only 
for the domestic market, the RSC expands the eligibility criteria and allows OCIs and 
PIOs to pursue surrogacy thereby opening up the market. But, it incredulously expects 
that surrogates in the hopes of being “role models” for society, will carry a child through 
term for strangers without any compensation even when wealthy OCIs and PIOs 
commission surrogacy. Who would such “willing women” be and how would the 
government prevent their forced labour and exploitation? Even if the Committee’s 
suggestions are accepted, expecting the performance of reproductive labour for third 
parties without payment will raise the presumption that such labour is forced for lack of 
payment and will therefore violate Article 23 of the Constitution.
In conclusion, the government now has the reports of two parliamentary committees 
wherein the collective wisdom of more than 50 MPs has demanded a fundamental 
overhaul of the Bill. Even as some of the recommendations of the RSC seem acceptable 
to the government, there are some glaring omissions which may well tie up the Bill in 
constitutional litigation for years, particularly around issues of discrimination, right to 
privacy and forced labour, rendering uncertain (once again) the legal landscape for those 
who harbour the hope of making families through surrogacy. For all these reasons, it is 
important that as the government updates the Bill, it gives due consideration to these 
issues of fundamental importance. Otherwise, it would miss an important opportunity 
for sensible law reform.
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